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Abstract
This paper uses a two-country, sticky-price model with non-atomistic wage setters to
study the role of collective wage bargaining in the propagation of monetary shocks. I find
that the welfare transmissions of a monetary expansion are reinforced by different labor
market structures. Non-atomistic domestic unions anticipate that their wage demands raise
real labor income through a movement of the terms of trade. This leads to an additional
channel of transmission of monetary policy that goes through aggregate supply. Yet, work-
ers benefit more from a monetary expansion when the exchange rate pass-through is not
limited and the elasticity of substitution across traded goods is sizable. It follows that wage
mark-ups charged by unions endogenously vary with those structural parameters. In partic-
ular, labor and product market distortions are strategic substitute in affecting the perceived
labor demand elasticity.
Keywords: non-atomistic agents, interdependence, exchange rate fluctuation, wage set-
ting
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1 Introduction
Wage setting reflects the particularity of the industrial relations system and the type of labor
regulation a country traditionally subscribes to. However, its potential implications concern
not only wage compensation but also economic well-being. Indicators of collective bargain-
ing coverage, defined as the proportion of wage workers under a collective agreement, show
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considerable variations across countries (see Table 1). “In most countries in the OECD, the
majority of workers have their wages set by collective bargaining between employers and trade
unions at the plant, firm, industry or aggregate level” (Nickell et al., 2005, p. 6). Typically,
more centralized systems, where collective agreements are signed at national or sectoral level,
lead to a higher coverage of collective bargaining. Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether and
how the impact of monetary policy on welfare is affected by different labor market structures.
The existing literature on micro-founded general equilibrium models of open economy,
sparked by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), ignores wage bargaining systems as a channel affecting
the propagation of monetary policies across countries and over time. These studies do not
address the issue because either they adopt a Yeoman-Farmer framework (e.g. Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 1995; Tille, 2001; Canzoneri et al., 2005) or they assume atomistic wage setting (e.g.
Benigno, 2002; Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).1 This paper uses a
two-country, sticky-price model with non-atomistic wage setters to study the role of collective
wage bargaining in the propagation of monetary shocks.2 The analytical framework nests new
open economy macroeconomics models with atomistic wage setters as particular cases.
In a recent article, Tille (2008) assesses the role of international financial integration in af-
fecting the international transmission of monetary shocks. In the same vein, but with a different
focus, this paper analyzes how the international transmission of monetary shocks is affected by
different collective bargaining systems and how structural features of the model interact with
a non-atomistic wage setting. I extend earlier contributions (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Tille,
2001) by encompassing varying degrees of price flexibility, openness, collective bargaining
coverage, and exchange rate pass-through.
I find that a collective wage bargaining system plays a crucial role for the international
transmission of monetary policy. Models that rely on the atomistic wage-setting assumption
disregard the consequences of wage bargaining institutions on the overall level of wages and
the macroeconomic performance of labor market. Large domestic unions in fact anticipate that
their wage demands will increase real labor incomes relative to foreign unions through two
channels. First, when the degree of exchange rate pass-through is complete, a depreciation of
the exchange rate leads to a worsening in the terms of trade. Since prices do not adjust in the
short run, there is one-to-one relationship between the terms of trade and exchange rate move-
ments. Domestic wages claims are perceived to raise real domestic incomes by worsening the
terms of trade and hence increasing relative output through the consumption switching towards
home goods. Second, when the degree of exchange rate pass-through is zero, a depreciation of
the exchange rate entails improving the terms of trade, without affecting cross-country output
demands. In this case, wage pressures are perceived to raise workers’ real incomes and hence
domestic consumption relative to the foreign one through an improvement in the terms of trade.
1For some surveys on the new open economy macroeconomics literature, see Sarno (2001), Bowman and
Doyle (2003), and Lane (2001).
2See Calmfors (2001) and Cukierman (2004) for extensive surveys of the non-atomistic wage setting literature.
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These effects hold only when unions have a positive mass and are reinforced by a higher rate of
collective bargaining coverage, since labor unions internalize the effects of their wage claims
on aggregate variables to a larger extent.
The impact of wage claims on workers’ welfare however depends on the ability of wage
setters to affect workers’ income, consumption and effort. In particular, workers benefit more
from a collective wage bargaining system when the exchange rate pass-through is not limited
and the elasticity of substitution across traded goods is large enough to entail a significant
increase in their income in the wake of a depreciation of exchange rate. Intuitively, when
the elasticity of substitution is relatively low, non-atomistic wage setters anticipate that the
worsening in terms of trade caused by wage hikes is not offset by the increase in domestic
demand. This leads to wage restraints and lower labor income. Conversely, a lower exchange
rate pass-through induces more wage aggressiveness through the perceived improvement in the
terms of trade, but reduces the role of labor institutions in affecting welfare per se. Output
demand, in this case, is less responsive to monetary policy and terms-of-trade movements.
Since unions’ mark-ups are endogenous to structural parameters, such as the elasticity of
substitution across goods and labor types, the model shows a strategic interaction between
labor and product market distortions. Specifically, labor and product market distortions are
strategic substitute in affecting the labor demand elasticity under collective bargaining systems.
Moreover, the impact of non-atomistic wage setting on welfare is reinforced in more open
economies exhibiting relevant price rigidities.
The paper is organized as follows. The households and firms’ optimal conditions are pre-
sented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the main elements of non-atomistic wage setting in the
labor market. Section 4 presents the welfare results, illustrating them with a simple and more
general equilibrium model. Section 5 concludes.
[Table 1 about here.]
2 Households and Firms’ optimization
The economy consists of two equally-sized countries, home and foreign. Each country is pop-
ulated by a continuum of agents, whose total measure is normalized to 1/2, and n > 1 labor
unions setting the wage that workers receive. Households work and consume different varieties
of goods produced by monopolistic competitive firms.
2.1 Households
For simplicity, I follow the notation in Tille (2008). Preferences are identical across countries.
A representative household derives utility from consumption, holdings of real balances, and
3
leisure as follows:
Ut =
∞
∑
s=0
β s
[
1
1−ρ (Ct+s)
1−ρ +
χ
1− ε
(
Mt+s
Pt+s
)1−ε
− κ
1+ω
(Ht+s)1+ω
]
. (1)
C is a standard CES consumption aggregate of baskets of traded goods produced in the home
country (CH), traded goods produced in the foreign country (CF ), and non-traded goods pro-
duced in the home country (CN):
C =
[(
1− γ
2− γ
) 1
λ
(CH)
λ−1
λ +
(
1− γ
2− γ
) 1
λ
(CF)
λ−1
λ +
(
γ
2− γ
) 1
λ
(CN)
λ−1
λ
] λ
λ−1
, (2)
where λ ≥ 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the three sub-baskets.3 The consumption-
based price indexes as well as sub-basket expressions are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
Notice that consumption indexes CH , CF , and CN , are defined over consumption of all the
varieties of each good, where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across brands in a given
country. I assume that the elasticity of substitution across brands is at least as large as the
elasticity of substitution across goods: θ ≥ λ . H represents total hours worked by domestic
households. M/P denotes real money balances, where M are nominal balances and P is the
home country CPI defined as follows:
P =
[
1− γ
2− γ (PH)
1−λ +
1− γ
2− γ (PF)
1−λ +
γ
2− γ (PN)
1−λ
]1/(1−λ )
, (3)
where PH and PF indicate, respectively, the home-currency price of one unit of the composite
good of all home and foreign traded varieties, while PN is the price of one unit of the composite
good of non-traded varieties defined in Table 2.
2.2 Budget constraint and intertemporal optimization
Home households supply labor services to firms, receiving wages W and dividends D on their
ownership of domestic firms. The home households’ budget constraint in period t is:
PtCt +Mt +Bt+1 =WtHt +Mt−1+Tt +Dt +(1+ it)Bt , (4)
where Bt+1 denotes the quantity of home-currency bond purchased by the households at the
end of the period. There is free trade between countries in such a nominal bond. Each unit of
the home currency bond pays a return of 1+ it . T denotes a lump-sum transfer.
3For simplicity, I abstract from the case where λ < 1. The case of λ > 0 is investigated in Tille (2001).
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The representative home household maximizes utility subject to (4) choosing sequences of
consumption, bond and money holdings. This leads to the following first-order conditions:(
Mt
Pt
)ε
= χCρt
1+ it+1
it+1
, (5)
Cρt+1 = β (1+ it+1)
Pt
Pt+1
Cρt , (6)
where eqs. (5) and (6) are respectively the money demand and the Euler relation. The labor
supply will be derived below solving the union’s problem. Labor unions are in fact in charge of
wage setting decisions, while households supply whatever quantity of labor is required to clear
the market for a given wage.
Bonds traded internationally are in zero net supply4
Bt +B∗t = 0. (7)
I abstract from government spending and assume that in each country the seigniorage income
is repaid to domestic households through a lump-sum transfer
Tt = Mt −Mt−1. (8)
Combining budget constraints (4) and (8) lead to the following current account in the home
country:
PtCt +Bt+1 = REVt +(1+ it)Bt , (9)
where REV ≡ D+WH denotes the sales revenues of all firms as the sum of their dividend and
wage income.
2.3 Firms
In the domestic goods market, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms,
each producing a particular brand z. Production by these firms is a linear function of hours.
Aggregating consumption demands from the home and foreign households yields the demands
faced by home firms in the traded and non-traded sectors:
YTt(z) =
1
2− γ
{[
PHt(z)
PHt
]−θ [PHt
Pt
]−λ
Ct +
[
P∗Ht(z)
P∗Ht
]−θ [P∗Ht
P∗t
]−λ
C∗t
}
, (10)
YNt(z) =
1
2− γ
[
PNt(z)
PNt
]−θ [PNt
Pt
]−λ
Ct , (11)
4I employ the convention of denoting the corresponding foreign variables by *.
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where PHt(z) is the price, in home currency, charged to home households for the brand z in
the traded sector, P∗Ht(z) is the price, in foreign currency, charged to foreign households, and
PNt(z) is the price, in home currency, charged to home households for the brand sold in the non-
traded sector. PHt and Pt are the home-currency price indexes faced by the home household,
as presented in Table 2, while P∗Ht and P∗t are the corresponding isomorphic price indexes, in
foreign currency, faced by the foreign household.
Profits of domestic firms producing a traded brand z are given by
DTt(z) =
PHt(z)−Wt
2− γ
[
PHt(z)
PHt
]−θ [PHt
Pt
]−λ
Ct +
StP∗Ht(z)−Wt
2− γ
[
P∗Ht(z)
P∗Ht
]−θ [P∗Ht
P∗t
]−λ
C∗t ,
(12)
where S is the exchange rate defined in terms of units of home currency per unit of foreign
currency. I assume that profits are entirely distributed as dividends.
When firms can adjust their prices, they charge a mark-up over the wage cost as follows:
PHt(z) = StP∗Ht(z) = PNt(z) =
θ
θ −1Wt ∀z, (13)
P∗Ft(z) = S
−1
t PFt(z) = P
∗
Nt(z) =
θ
θ −1W
∗
t ∀z. (14)
This is a standard result due to the assumption of monopolistic competition.
In the short-run, only an exogenous fraction τ ∈ [0,1] of prices can be adjusted. Specifically,
prices are completely rigid when τ = 0 and fully flexible when τ = 1. Moreover, following
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), an exogenous fraction η ∈ [0,1] of exchange rate movements is
passed through to prices in the foreign market, with the case of complete and zero exchange
rate pass-through corresponding to η = 1 and η = 0 respectively.
3 Labor market
This section analyzes how non-atomistic labor unions optimally set their wage anticipating the
impact of their wage demands on aggregate variables. In order to disentangle the key mecha-
nisms, I focus on a baseline utility with all goods traded (γ = 0), log utility of consumption and
real balances (ρ = ε = 1), and preset prices (τ = 0). Let the aggregate measure of hours in the
home country be defined as
H =
[∫ 1
0
(H( j))
σ−1
σ d j
] σ
σ−1
σ > 1, (15)
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution across the various categories of labor. From cost mini-
mization, demand by home firms for a particular type of labor j is given by:
Ht( j) =
[
Wt( j)
Wt
]−σ
Ht , (16)
where W ( j) indicates the nominal wage of labor type j and W is the following nominal wage
index:
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
(Wt( j))1−σ d j
] 1
1−σ
. (17)
3.1 The impact of nominal wage rises on aggregate variables
In each country workers are organized in n > 1 labor unions. I assume that all types of labor
are unionized and equally distributed among unions. Therefore 1/n indicates both the repre-
sentative union’s mass and the fraction of workers covered by a collective agreement, i.e. the
fraction of workers whose pay have been negotiated through collective bargaining. This frame-
work captures the fact that more centralized systems, whereby collective agreements are signed
at national or sectoral level, typically have a higher coverage of collective bargaining. Since
the representative union x has a positive mass, it will anticipate that
∂W
∂W (x)
=
1
n
(
W (x)
W
)−σ
, (18)
i.e., the higher its mass the more the x-th union internalizes the impact of its wage settlement on
aggregate wage (see e.g. Bratsiotis and Martin, 1999; Soskice and Iversen, 2000; Lippi, 2003).
Eq. (18) is derived in Appendix A and is key to the model results.
Wages are flexible5 and set under discretion, namely taking past and future variables as
given.6 When prices are preset, the main channel through which non-atomistic unions (i.e. n
finite) may affect aggregate variables is the exchange rate and hence the terms of trade. Specif-
ically, Appendix B shows that, combining the Euler equations, money demands (5), output
demands (10)-(11), current account (9), optimal price-setting relations (13)-(14), and eq. (18),
Result 1 In a symmetric equilibrium (W (x) =W), a wage rise in the home country is perceived
to lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate
∂ logS
∂ logW (x)
=
θ −1
θ(1−η)+ηλ
1
n
> 0. (19)
This effect is smaller the higher the elasticity of substitution across goods λ and the lower the
degree of exchange rate pass-through η .
5Wage stickiness does not qualitatively alter the main results of the paper.
6Following the literature on non-atomistic wage setting, I assume that unions take the impact of their wages on
profits and fiscal policy as given (e.g. Guzzo and Velasco, 1999; Lippi, 2003; Gnocchi, 2006).
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An intuitive account of the mechanism through which domestic wage pressures are expected
to depreciate the exchange rate is as follows: since wages are bargained simultaneously in an
uncoordinated manner, domestic unions perceive that an increase in their wages raises their
(real) labor income relative to foreign unions’ one. This arises from the anticipated impact of
wage hikes on the terms of trade and hence on the exchange rate. Since prices do not adjust in
the short run, there is in fact a one-to-one relationship between the terms of trade and exchange
rate movements. Specifically, when the degree of exchange rate pass-through is complete (η =
1), domestic wages claims are expected to raise real domestic incomes by increasing relative
output through a worsening in the terms of trade (i.e. through a depreciation of the exchange
rate). This effect reduces the relative price of goods produced in the home country and induces
households to switch their purchases towards home-produced goods, thereby boosting output
in the home country. When the degree of exchange rate pass-through is zero (η = 0), instead,
domestic wage claims are expected to raise domestic workers’ income through an improvement
in the terms of trade (i.e. through a depreciation of the exchange rate) since relative output
demands are not affected. The responsiveness of aggregate demand to the exchange rate is in
fact larger the higher the degree of exchange rate pass-through and the elasticity of substitution
across goods λ . This explains why the sensitivity of the exchange rate movements to wage
is proportional to the degree of exchange rate pass-through η , and inversely related to the
elasticity of substitution across goods λ . Key to the above result is that unions have positive
mass (i.e. 1/n > 0). In this way they internalize, at least partially, the effects of wage claims
on aggregate variables.
Result 2 An increase in domestic wages is perceived to reduce aggregate output if the degree
of exchange rate pass-through is small, η < 1/λ . Conversely, it raises output if the degree of
pass-through is large, η > 1/λ :
∂ logY
∂ logW (x)
=
(θ −1)(ηλ −1)
2[θ(1−η)+ηλ ]
1
n
. (20)
As noted by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), in the case of λ = η = 1 the ratio of Home and
Foreign consumption is constant in equilibrium. Therefore, with some degree of exchange
rate pass-through, a rise in domestic wages is perceived to entail a relative increase in nominal
incomes but also a proportional decline in purchasing power through the worsening in the
terms of trade so that real incomes remain unchanged. When λ > 1, instead, the real incomes
of Home workers increase relative to Foreign workers.
In presence of collective wage bargaining, a rise in W (x) has hence two opposite effects
on domestic output depending on the degree of exchange rate pass-through. With zero pass-
through, a wage hike depreciates the exchange rate (see Result 1) and leads to an improvement
in the terms of trade, i.e. it reduces the relative price of goods produced in the foreign coun-
try. This outcome induces domestic agents to switch their purchases towards foreign-produced
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goods so as to boost their consumption, thereby decreasing output in the home country (see
Appendix C for details). Conversely, with a sufficiently high degree of exchange rate pass-
through, η > 1/λ , the terms of trade worsens in the wake of an exchange rate depreciation,
diminishing the relative price of goods produced in the home country. As a result, consumption
of domestic goods stemming from domestic (and foreign) agents rises.
3.2 Unions’ optimization
Each union plays a Nash game with other unions: they simultaneously set nominal wages,
taking the other unions’ nominal wage as given. In doing that, the x-th labor unions sets the
nominal wage W (x) on behalf of its members maximizing their lifetime utility function (1),
disregarding liquidity effects, subject to the budget constraint (4) and labor demand (16) for all
members j ∈ x.7 The solution to the union’s problem is8
Wt(x) =Wt =
δ
δ −1κPtCtH
ω
t , (21)
where δ ≡ Σh1−Σp is the elasticity of labor demand to real wage perceived by the u-th union for
each of its members:
Σh ≡− ∂ logH(x)∂ logW (x) = σ
(
1− 1
n
)
− ∂ logHt
∂ logWt
1
n
= σ
(
1− 1
n
)
+
(θ −1)(1−ηλ )
2(θ −ηθ +ηλ )
1
n
, (22)
Σp ≡ ∂ logP∂ logW (x) =
η(θ −1)
2(θ −ηθ +ηλ )
1
n
. (23)
Eq. (22) defines the elasticity of domestic labor demand as a weighted average (with
weights respectively 1−1/n and 1/n) of the elasticity of substitution across labor types σ and
of the elasticity of domestic aggregate labor demand (20).9 Notice that it nests the standard case
of a labor demand elasticity equal to σ as a special case (i.e. atomistic wage setters, n → ∞).
With large unions, the mark-up δ/(δ − 1) depends on the response of aggregate variables to
wage demands as assessed above.
Result 3 A higher degree of exchange rate pass-through raises the mark-up set by unions when
labor market distortions are sizeable σ < 1+θ(2n(λ−1)−1)+2nλ2(n−1)θ . Conversely, it reduces the mark-
up when labor market distortions are relatively small σ > 1+θ(2n(λ−1)−1)+2nλ2(n−1)θ .
Intuitively, a higher degree of exchange rate pass-through has two opposite effects on δ .
First, an increase in the x-th union’s wage raises its real wage inducing firms to substitute labor
7The benevolent union hypothesis is consistent with the traditional labor union theory (e.g. Oswald, 1985).
8More general first-order condition and mark-up charged by the x-th union are derived in Appendix C and D.
9This result is in contrast with the U-shaped relation predicted in Calmfors and Driffill (1988) between cen-
tralization of wage bargaining and economic performance, which in this case depends on the union’s mark-up.
The main reason is that the competition level in this model is not proportional to the degree of decentralization of
wage bargaining as in Calmfors and Driffill (1988). See Guzzo and Velasco (1999) for a discussion of this issue.
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types j ∈ x with other more competitive labor types j /∈ x. This substitution effect depends
on σ and is reinforced by the degree of exchange pass-through which leads to an increase in
CPI, thereby reducing other unions’ real wage to a larger extent. As a result, wage claims are
dampened through this channel. Each union in fact anticipates that, for a given reduction in em-
ployment, the real wage increase will be smaller the higher η . Second, an increase in exchange
rate pass-through leads to a greater consumers’ switch from foreign to domestic output, thereby
encouraging wage hikes. Since δ is a combination of these two effects, it will rise in the wake
of a higher degree of exchange rate pass-through when the first effect prevails, namely when
the degree of substitution across labor types is sufficiently large σ > 1+θ(2n(λ−1)−1)+2nλ2(n−1)θ .
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Result 4 Product and labor market distortions are strategic substitute in the perceived elas-
ticity of labor demand by non-atomistic unions in presence of non zero exchange rate pass-
through:
Sign
[
∂ 2δ
∂λ∂σ
]
= Sign
[
− 2(n−1)η
2(θ −1)
(η(θ −1+2nθ −2nλ )−2nθ)2
]
< 0.
Consider the case of a positive relationship between the elasticity of substitution across
goods λ and labor market elasticity δ .11 Result 4 states that a reduction in the monopolistic
power in the products market stemming from a larger λ abates the mark-up set by large unions
to a larger extent when labor market distortions are sizeable (i.e. σ small). In other words, the
presence of the elasticity of substitution across goods λ in the labor market elasticity δ indicates
an interaction between labor and goods market distortions. Intuitively, when labor market
distortions are relatively low, the increase in competitiveness between foreign and domestic
goods has a smaller impact on the unions’ mark-up which is already close to the efficient level.
Assuming that both λ and σ are negatively related to the degree of regulation,12 respec-
tively in the product and labor market, Result 4 is in line with recent empirical evidence (e.g.
Fiori et al., 2008), whereby the impact of product market deregulation on employment is larger
when labor market regulations are more stringent. Notice that, differently from Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003), the combination of labor and product market regulations affects real vari-
ables in the short run. Moreover, an increase in the elasticity of substitution across goods not
necessarily reduces the real wages (see discussion above).
10Cuciniello (2009) focuses on the strategic effects arising in a similar labor market structure but under interna-
tional time-consistent monetary policies.
11In general the impact of λ on δ depends on Sign[η(θ −1+2σ)−2n(1+(1−η)θ +ησ)].
12The cross-country substitutability λ , for example, may be assumed to be a function of the number of firms
(e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003) which in turn depends on legal barriers restricting access to markets and other
barriers to entry related to market or industry structure (e.g. market dominance and vertical integration in network
industries.). Similarly, one can imagine that employment protection legislation tends to raise labor adjustment
costs, thereby reducing the elasticity of substitution across labor services σ .
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4 The welfare impact of monetary shocks
This section presents how the international transmission of monetary shocks on welfare is af-
fected by collective wage bargaining systems. I describes the solution method and focus on the
impact of consumption and effort disregarding real balances. Next, main results are derived in
a more general setup by a numerical illustration.
4.1 A symmetric steady state
In an initial symmetric steady state households do not hold any net claims on each other, namely
no cross-country bond holdings B0 = B∗0 = 0. All prices in the same currency are identical
P0 = S0P∗0 =
θ
θ −1W0 =
θ
θ −1S0W
∗
0 , (24)
i.e. the purchasing power parity condition holds. From the above expression it turns out that
the exchange rate in the steady state is given by the relative wages ratio
S0 = P0/P∗0 =W0/W
∗
0 = M0/M
∗
0 . (25)
The Euler condition (6) and the corresponding foreign one pin down the steady-state real inter-
est rate
i0 = i∗0 =
1−β
β
. (26)
All agents in a country are symmetric, which from eq. (9) implies that P0C0 = D0 +W0Y0 =
P0Y0. Finally, using the unions’ first order conditions yields
D0
P0C0
=
D∗0
P∗0 C
∗
0
=
1
θ
, (27)
C0 =C∗0 = Y0 = Y
∗
0 =
[
θ −1
κθ
δ −1
δ
] 1
ρ+ω
. (28)
4.2 Solution method
The economy is initially at a symmetric steady state. At period t an unforeseen permanent
monetary shock occurs and information about future shocks is revealed (perfect foresight equi-
librium). From period t to t +1 (i.e. the short run), I allow for nominal rigidities in prices. As
illustrated above, only an exogenous fraction τ of all prices can adjust in the short run. Wages,
instead, are completely flexible in the short run. Next, at period t +1 (i.e. the long run) prices
and wages fully adjust. From then on the economy is in a long-run steady state, with variables
denoted by an upper bar.
Recall that the law of one price holds in the short run only for firms that can reset their
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prices. Instead, the other firms in the traded sector that cannot reset prices may engage in
pricing-to-market across countries. In such a case, an exogenous fraction η of the price charged
to consumer abroad moves with the exchange rate, spanning the case of producer currency
pricing (η = 1) and local currency pricing (η = 0).
I will express the various relations in terms of log deviations from the symmetric steady
state denoting these deviations by Sans-Serif fonts: v = logV − logV0 = (V −V0)/V0.
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), I abstract from the direct welfare impact of real
balances and focus on consumption and effort. Thus, in studying the international transmission
of a monetary shock, I will look at the welfare implications in the limiting case as χ → 0 in eq.
(1). Home households’ utility is hence rewritten as:
u= c− θ −1
θ
δ −1
δ
y+
β
1−β
[
c¯− θ −1
θ
δ −1
δ
y¯
]
. (29)
4.3 Baseline specification
To obtain tractable analytical solutions, I consider a baseline setup with linear effort (ω = 0),
elasticity of substitution across brands equals to the elasticity of substitution across different
types of goods (θ = λ ), only traded goods (γ = 0), log utility of consumption (ρ = 1), and
log real money balances (ε = 1). I discuss the implication of more general preferences by
numerical exercise.
Henceforth, for sake of conciseness, I illustrate the welfare impact of a permanent home
monetary shock occurring in period t (i.e. mt+s = m¯, ∀s ≥ 0) assuming foreign monetary
stance be constant (i.e. m∗ = m¯∗ = 0). It can be shown that, under this parametrization, a
monetary shock yields a depreciation of the home currency:
s=
1+β (λ −1)
1+η(λ −1)+β (1−η)(λ −1)m¯, (30)
where s/m¯> 0.
4.3.1 Nominal rigidities and complete exchange rate pass-through
I start with the case where prices are preset (τ = 0) in the short run and there is full exchange
rate pass-through (η = 1). When prices cannot adjust, aggregate labor demand elasticity to
wages, Σh, is given by eq. (22).
Result 5 Under preset prices (τ = 0) and complete exchange rate pass-through (η = 1), the
welfare gain of the Home country following a monetary expansion is
u=
1
θ
[
1+
2(θ −1)(1+(2n−1)θ)
2(n−1)θσ − (θ −1)2
]
m¯,
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where
u
m¯
> 0,
∂
∂n
{ u
m¯
}
< 0.
In presence of large unions the mark-up δ (δ −1)−1 depends positively on the elasticity of
substitution across goods λ .13 When the baskets of goods produced by the home and foreign
countries are close substitute (λ > 1 ), each union anticipates that its wage claim will trigger
an increase in real labor income proportional to λ (see Section 3). This clearly raises wage
pressures through the unions’ mark-up so that the additional effort required to produce output
in the wake of a monetary expansion is relatively small. It turns out that the worsening in
the terms of trade associated with a depreciation of the exchange rate will enhance real sales
revenues and hence consumption, more than compensating the effort cost.14 Evidently, this
effect is reinforced by the unions’ capacity for internalizing the impact of their wage demands
on the exchange rate: the higher the degree of collective bargaining coverage (1/n), the higher
will be the mark-up set by the unions.
The impact on domestic welfare of a one per cent permanent monetary expansion in the
home country is illustrated through a numerical example in Table 3 so as to complement the
analytical results. I focus on three alternative rates of collective bargaining coverage. Under a
high rate, I assume that (1/n =)70 per cent of the workers is covered by collective bargaining
agreements (namely wage determination), while under a medium and low rate respectively 50
and 10 per cent. Two values for the elasticity across goods types λ are assumed: low (λ = 2.5)
and high (λ = 7).15 The elasticity of labor types σ is set at 11, while the elasticity of brand
types θ is set at 7. The discount rate β is equal to 0.96.
Table 3 summarizes the welfare effect of a monetary expansion under different levels of col-
lective wage bargaining (namely high, medium and low) and under competitive labor markets
(namely when the real wage is equal to marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, δ →∞). Welfare is sensitive to the system of wage determination. The top panel of Ta-
ble 3 displays the case of a high elasticity of goods types, λ = 7. In this case the positive impact
of a monetary expansion on welfare with a high rate of wage-bargaining coverage is roughly
three times as large as with a low rate (u = 0.47 vs. u = 0.16). As underlined above, a high
degree of internalization leads unions to anticipate the repercussions of their wage demands on
aggregate variables to a larger extent. In particular, when the elasticity of substitution across
13Notice that, in order to have a mark-up δδ−1 > 1, the following condition has to hold σ >
1+(θ−1)2+(2n−1)θ
2(n−1)θ .
This implies a negative relationship between λ and labor market elasticity δ (see footnote 11), and um¯ > 0.
14In cross-country differential u−u∗ > 0. This result is in contrast with Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) where
u−u∗ = 0. The main reason is due to the fact that they abstract from labor market frictions (their model corre-
sponds to δ → ∞).
15Imbs and Me´jean’s (2009) estimates suggest that, when all elasticities are forced to be equal across sectors,
the aggregate substitutability λ in the US is between 2.5 and 3; while allowing for heterogeneity across sectors,
this aggregate elasticity is between 6 and 7.
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goods types is sizable, the currency depreciation in the wake of wage demands will raise domes-
tic aggregate demand to a larger extent, thereby boosting wage mark-ups. The competitiveness
gain for domestic agents then leads to such a large consumption switching towards domestic
goods that their income increases by enough to expand consumption despite the higher cost of
in terms of leisure.
In the case of a low elasticity of substitution across goods types λ = 2.5 (the bottom part
of Table 3), moving from a low to a high rate of collective bargaining coverage is not welfare
improving anymore. Intuitively, a reduction in λ boosts the aggregate labor demand elasticity,
thereby lowering the mark-up associated with the aggregate component. It turns out that a lower
rate of collective bargaining entails attaching a higher weight to the monopolistic distortion
stemming from σ in eq. (22) with a welfare gain of 100 per cent (u= 0.01 vs. u= 0.02). Notice
that in this case a monetary expansion has still a positive welfare effect: it boosts employment
but allows domestic agents to purchase enough additional consumption to offset the cost of
their effort.
[Table 3 about here.]
4.3.2 Nominal rigidities and zero exchange rate pass-through
Result 6 Under preset prices (τ = 0) and zero exchange rate pass-through (η = 0), the welfare
gain of the home country following a monetary expansion is
u=
[
1+
1
θ
+
2n(θ −1)
θ −1+2(n−1)θσ
]
m¯,
where
u
m¯
> 0,
∂
∂n
{ u
m¯
}
< 0.
When there is zero exchange rate pass-through (η = 0) and prices are preset, relative prices
faced by consumers are not affected by the exchange depreciation in either country. The impact
of a monetary expansion in the short run affects demand by one half per cent y = 1/2m¯, while
raising consumption by one per cent c= m¯. Under this parametrization, long-run consumption
and output are instead not affected by a monetary shock. It turns out that the impact on the
utility is always positive since, with import prices set in the customers’ currency, the currency
depreciation associated with a monetary expansion enlarges agents’ export revenues (see Betts
and Devereux, 2000).
Result 6 highlights how the impact of a monetary shock on welfare is positively affected
by collective wage setting. Intuitively, a large union anticipates higher revenues attached to the
depreciation of the exchange rate (see Section 3), thereby boosting its wage demand. However,
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the welfare gains of moving from a low to a high rate of collective bargaining coverage are
now 13 per cent (u= 0.69 vs. u= 0.61). This indicates that a zero exchange rate pass-through
reduces the role of collective wage bargaining system in shaping welfare effects, compared to
the case of complete exchange rate pass-through. Intuitively, when import prices are insulated
from exchange rate movements in the short run (η = 0), the exchange rate depreciation caused
by a monetary expansion does not affect the consumption switch from foreign to domestic
traded goods as in the case of complete pass-through, thereby reducing its impact on aggregate
demand (y). But the effect of wage setting on utility operates through the output demand, i.e.
how employment responds to a monetary shock. Moreover, Table 3 illustrates that welfare
is unaffected by the elasticity of substitution across goods types with zero pass-through. This
reflects the fact that a zero exchange rate pass-through leads to y− y∗= 0, ruling out the channel
through which the elasticity of substitution λ influences output differential.
4.4 General specification
In this subsection I consider a more general specification of the utility function: ρ = 4, ε =
2, ω = 1, γ = 0.75. The main results are robust to the inclusion of a richer utility and the
presence of non-traded goods. Table 4 shows that welfare gains from a home monetary shock
are substantial with complete exchange rate pass-through. Specifically, comparing high and low
collective wage bargaining levels in the top and bottom panels of Table 4, a high collective wage
bargaining system generates welfare advantages under complete exchange rate pass-through
amounting to 123 per cent (u = 0.29 vs. u = 0.13) and 133 per cent (u = 0.14 vs. u = 0.06),
respectively under high and low elasticity of substitution across goods.
[Table 4 about here.]
In the case of zero exchange rate pass-through, instead, welfare gains are roughly 4 per
cent in either panel of Table 4. In line with the previous section results, a zero exchange
rate pass-through mutes the role of collective wage bargaining system in the monetary policy
transmission channel since the exchange rate depreciation, caused by a monetary expansion,
does not lead to a consumption switch from foreign to domestic traded goods (as in the case
of complete pass-through) and reduces its impact on aggregate demand. Thus, the strategic
mechanism whereby large unions internalize that wage pressures affect aggregate demand via
movements of the terms of trade is now less relevant to the international transmission channel
of monetary policy.
How do openness and price stickiness influence domestic utility?
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates, for a given number of unions (n = 3) and goods elasticity (λ = 7), the
welfare transmission of a one per cent monetary expansion under different degrees of openness
15
and price stickiness in presence of zero pass-through. In welfare terms, a domestic monetary
expansion leads to a substantial gain for the home country when the economy is more open
and prices stickier. Clearly, monetary policy can have real effects in this model as long as
prices do not fully adjust. In presence of flexible prices, in fact, a monetary expansion in the
home country leads to a proportional depreciation of the home currency and to an increase in
all nominal variables.
Interestingly, for a given degree of price stickiness τ , the welfare effect of a monetary ex-
pansion is increasing in the degree of openness. The key reason is that, in a more open economy,
the impact of the terms of trade on consumption is larger. In particular, since a depreciation of
the exchange rate in the wake of a monetary expansion (see eq. (30)) causes an improvement
in the terms of trade under a zero pass-through only when some goods are traded, consump-
tion rises via the increase in consumption of foreign produced traded goods. Moreover, as
noted above, output is less responsive to monetary expansion under zero pass-through. Thus, a
monetary expansion leads to larger welfare improvement in more open economies.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studied the role of collective agreement mechanisms in the labor market in a stan-
dard open-economy model considering the impact of a monetary expansion on welfare. The
level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining
wage levels and differs greatly across countries. The results show that models that disregard
collective wage bargaining, e.g. by assuming atomistic wage setting, can yield substantial er-
rors in the valuation of the welfare gain from the depreciation of the home currency.
In presence of collective bargaining coverage, wages are determined, among others, by the
degree of exchange rate pass-through and the elasticity of substitution across goods. When
exchange rate fluctuations affect the price of imported goods, a monetary expansion in the
home country can magnify its welfare effect depending on the rate of collective bargaining
coverage. Non-atomistic wage setters in fact anticipate a rise in their real income in the wake
of their wage demands through two mechanisms depending on the degree of exchange rate
pass-through. First, when there is some degree of exchange rate pass-through, wage setters
raise real labor income and consumption via a worsening in the terms of trade. This makes
all home goods more competitive vis-a`-vis foreign ones, thereby boosting domestic output and
generating an increase in consumption of home-produced traded goods. Second, when the
degree of exchange rate pass-through is zero, large unions perceive to raise workers’ income
through an improvement in terms of trade in the wake of their wage demand, letting workers
consume more foreign-produced traded goods.
When prices are not affected by the exchange rate in the short run, namely with zero ex-
change rate pass-through, the impact of a monetary expansion on welfare is less responsive
to labor institutions. This is mainly due to the fact that labor demand is more insulated from
16
exchange rate movements and is perceived as being more elastic by non-atomistic wage set-
ters. Both effects entail wage bargaining systems having a lower impact on labor income, since
workers do not benefit as much from the depreciation of the exchange rate in the wake of a
monetary expansion.
The model shows that large welfare gains arising from centralization of wage bargaining
depend on the interaction between labor and product markets. Product and labor market distor-
tions are strategic substitute for unions: when labor market distortions are sizeable, the increase
in competitiveness between foreign and domestic goods has a more relevant impact on wage
determination. Moreover, for a given collective bargaining system, the welfare results are more
sensitive to the degree of openness and price stickiness.
A possible extension of this analysis is to include alternative shocks, such as government
spending and productivity shocks, and studying endogenous monetary policy. I plan to pursue
these extensions in future works.
Appendix
A Impact of union’s wage on aggregate wage
From the wage index (17), we obtain
∂Wt
∂Wt(x)
=
∂
∂Wt(x)
[∫ 1
0
Wt( j)1−σ d j
] 1
1−σ
=
∂
∂Wt(x)
[∫
j∈x
Wt( j)1−σ d j+
∫
j/∈x
Wt( j)1−σ d j
] 1
1−σ
=
1
n
[
Wt(x)
Wt
]−σ
=
1
n
, (31)
where the last equality holds in a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. when W (x) =W .
B Exchange rate elasticity to union’s wage
In order to assess how trade unions internalize the impact of their wage settlement on the
exchange rate, it is convenient to log-linearize key equations around a steady state described in
Section 4.1. Henceforth, I will denote a log-linearized variable V around its steady state V0 as
follows: v ≡ (V −V0)/V0; and its cross-country difference as vR ≡ v− v∗.
From the home country current account (9) and the corresponding foreign current account,
cRt +p
R
t +2bt+1 =
1
θ
dRt +
θ −1
θ
(yRt +w
R
t )+
1
β
2bt . (32)
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The optimal firms’ prices can be log-linearized as follows
pHt(z) = pNt(z) = τwt p∗Ht = τ(wt − st)− stη(1− τ),
p∗Ft(z) = p
∗
Nt(z) = τw∗t pFt = τ(w∗t + st)+ stη(1− τ).
Using the above expressions, difference between the home CPI (3) and the corresponding for
the foreign country turns out to be
pRt =
2st(1− γ)(η(1− τ)+ τ)+wRt γτ
2− γ . (33)
Similarly, from the aggregate output demands and revenues
yRt =
cRt γ +λ (pRt γ−wRt (2− γ)τ +2st(1− γ)(η +(1−η)τ))
2− γ , (34)
dRt
θ
=
2st(1− γ)(1−η)(1− τ)
2− γ +
wRt (1−θ(1− τ))
θ
+
yRt
θ
. (35)
Next the Euler equations and money demands respectively yield
β iRt = st+1− st , (36)
ε(mRt −pRt ) = ρcRt −
β
1−β (β i
R
t ) (37)
Finally, combining eqs. (32)-(37) and taking profits and fiscal policy as given, the elasticity of
exchange rate to aggregate home wage is
∂ st
∂wt
=
2−2θ(1− τ)−2λτ + γ(θ −1+ τ−θτ)
γ(2θ(1− τ)−1−2η(θ −1)(1− τ)+2τ)−2θ +2(θ −λ )(η + τ−ητ) . (38)
Eq. (19) is obtained by using eq. (31) and evaluating the above expression at τ = γ = 0.
C Labor demand and CPI elasticities to union’s wage
The consumer price indexes (3) are log-linearized around a symmetric state (Section 4.1) as
follows:
pt =
1− γ
2− γ pHt +
1− γ
2− γ pFt +
γ
2− γ pNt , (39)
p∗t =
1− γ
2− γ p
∗
Ht +
1− γ
2− γ p
∗
Ft +
γ
2− γ p
∗
Nt . (40)
Aggregate output Y = YN +YT (11) and (10), and profits D = DN +DT (12) yield
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yt =
2−2γ
2− γ
[
−λ
[
1
2
(pHt −pt)+ 12(p
∗
Ht −p∗t )
]
+
1
2
(ct + c∗t )
]
+
γ
2− γ [−λ (pNt −pt)+ ct ]
(41)
y∗t =
2−2γ
2− γ
[
−λ
[
1
2
(pFt −pt)+ 12(p
∗
Ft −p∗t )
]
+
1
2
(ct + c∗t )
]
+
γ
2− γ [−λ (p
∗
Nt −p∗t )+ c∗t ]
(42)
dt = θ
[
2−2γ
2− γ
[
1
2
(pHt + st +p∗Ht)
]
+
γ
2− γ pNt
]
− (θ −1)wt + yt (43)
d∗t = θ
[
2−2γ
2− γ
[
1
2
(pFt − st +p∗Ft)
]
+
γ
2− γ p
∗
Nt
]
− (θ −1)w∗t + y∗t . (44)
Expanding current accounts (9),
pt + ct +bt+1 =
1
θ
dt +
θ −1
θ
(wt + yt)+
1
β
bt . (45)
Similarly, money demands (5) are linearized as follows
ε(mt −pt) = ρct −β/(1−β )(β it+1) (46)
ε(m∗t −p∗t ) = ρc∗t −β/(1−β )(β i∗t+1). (47)
Next from the two Euler equations (6)
β it+1 = ρ(ct+1− ct)+pt+1−pt (48)
β i∗t+1 = ρ(c
∗
t+1− c∗t )+p∗t+1−p∗t + st+1− st . (49)
Finally, combining all the above expression and taking profits, fiscal and next period variables
as given, I obtain
∂pt
∂wt
=
2(1− γ)τ +2γτ− 2(1−γ)(η(1−τ)+τ)(γ(θ−1)(τ−1)+2(θ−1−θτ+λτ))γ(2η(θ−1)(τ−1)−1+2θ(1−τ)+2τ)+2(θ−λ )(η+τ−ητ)
2(2− γ)−2θ , (50)
∂yt
∂wt
= −
(
γ2+β (γ−2)(ε−1)+2(ε +λρ)− γ(1+ ε +2λρ))τ
(2− γ)2ρ
−(1− γ)(γ(−1+(2−β +(β −1)ε)η)−2(−1+(β −1)(ε−1)η +ηλρ))
(γ−2)2ρ
∂ st
∂wt
−(1− γ)(1−η)(β (γ−2)(ε−1)− γε +2(γ−1+ ε−λρ))τ
(γ−2)2ρ
∂ st
∂wt
, (51)
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where ∂ st/∂wt is eq. (38). From the eqs. (16), (38), (51), and (50), define the elasticity of
labor demand to real wage δ as follows
δ ≡ Σh
1−Σp , Σh ≡−
∂ logH(x)
∂ logW (x)
= σ
(
1− 1
n
)
− ∂yt
∂wt
1
n
, Σp ≡ ∂ logP∂ logW (x) =
∂pt
∂wt
1
n
.
(52)
D Derivation of the union’s first-order condition
In order to derive the x-th union first-order condition, it is convenient to reproduce the La-
grangian relevant to this purpose
L W =
Ct(x)1−ρ
1−ρ −
κ
1+ω
Ht(x)1+ω +ξt
[
Ct(x)+
Mt(x)
Pt
+
Bt+1(x)
Pt
−Wt(x)Ht(x)
Pt
− Mt−1(x)
Pt
− Tt(x)
Pt
− Dt(x)
Pt
− (1+ it)Bt(x)Pt
]
, ∀x ∈ {1,2, ...,n}.(53)
The first-order condition with respect to Wt(x) is given by
− κ
1+ω
∂Ht(x)1+ω
∂Wt(x)
=−ξt
Ht(x)+ ∂Ht(x)∂Wt(x)Wt(x)
Pt
− ∂Pt
∂Wt(x)
Wt(x)Ht(x)
P2t

−κHt(x)ω ∂Ht(x)∂Wt(x) =−
C−ρt (x)Ht(x)
Pt
[
1+
∂Ht(x)
∂Wt(x)
Wt(x)
Ht(x)
− ∂Pt
∂Wt(x)
Wt(x)
Pt
]
κHt(x)ωΣh =−C
−ρ
t (x)Wt(x)
Pt
[1−Σh−Σp]
=⇒Wt(x) =Wt = δδ −1κPtC
ρ
t H
ω
t ,
where in the last equation we have dropped the x index because of the symmetry between
workers in equilibrium and used the definition of δ derived in Appendix C.
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Figure 1: Degree of openness and price stickiness
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Table 1: Collective bargaining coverage, 2007 or latest yearabc
Less than 15% 15-50% 51-70% Higher than 70%
European
Union
Latvia, Lithuania Hungary,
Poland,
Slovakia,
United
Kingdom
Czech
Republic,
Germany,
Luxembourg
Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece,
Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden
Non-EU Serbia, Turkey Switzerland Norway
CIS countries Belarus, Russia,
Ukraine
North America United States Canada
Other
developed
economies
New Zealand Australia, Japan
East Asia Republic of Korea China
Pacific islands Kiribati
South Asia Nepal India
South-East
Asia
Indonesia,
Malaysia,
Philippines,
Singapore,
Thailand
Central Amer-
ica
El Salvador,
Mexico, Nicaragua
South America Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru
Venezuela Argentina, Bolivia,
Uruguay
Middle East United Arab
Emirates
North Africa Morocco Sudan
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Burundi, Comoros,
Malawi,
Mauritania
South Africa,
Ghana, Kenya,
Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo
Guinea,
Lesotho
Ethiopia, Niger,
Senegal
aSource: International Labour Office (2008) p. 38.
bThe rate of collective bargaining is an indicator of the extent to which the terms of employment are regulated
by collective agreements. It is defined as the number of employees covered by a collective agreement as a pro-
portion of the total number of employees (i.e. wage and salary earners). This rate is an “unadjusted” one in the
sense that it does not take into account the number of employees excluded from the right to bargain. Data on these
excluded employees are difficult to estimate and reliable data are not readily available.
cThe rate of collective bargaining is not necessarily the same as the union density (i.e. the ratio of the number
of union members to the total number of paid employees. The main difference comes from the fact that the
former reflects the presence of extension mechanisms which allow collective agreements to be applied to non-
union members. Extension mechanisms have been relatively common in European countries, but are sometimes
found in other regions such Africa (e.g. South Africa) and Latin America (e.g. Argentina).
24
Table 2: Home household’s consumption baskets and price indexes
CH =
[(
2
1−γ
)1/θ ∫ 1/2
γ/2 (CH(z))
(θ−1)/θ dz
]θ/(θ−1)
PH =
[
2
1−γ
∫ 1/2
γ/2 (PH(z))
1−θ dz
]1/(1−θ)
CF =
[(
2
1−γ
)1/θ ∫ 1−γ/2
1/2 (CF(z))
(θ−1)/θ dz
]θ/(θ−1)
PF =
[
2
1−γ
∫ 1−γ/2
1/2 (PF(z))
1−θ dz
]1/(1−θ)
CN =
[(
2
γ
)1/θ ∫ γ/2
0 (CN(z))
(θ−1)/θ dz
]θ/(θ−1)
PN =
[
2
γ
∫ γ/2
0 (PN(z))
1−θ dz
]1/(1−θ)
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Table 3: Welfare effect of a domestic monetary expansion (Baseline specification)
Baseline utility with high elasticity of goods types (ρ = 1,ε = 1,γ = 0,ω = 0,λ = 7)
Rate of collective bargaining coverage: High Medium Low Competitive
labor markets
Preset prices
–Complete exchange pass-through 0.47 0.23 0.16 0.07
–Zero exchange pass-through 0.69 0.65 0.61 0.57
Baseline utility with low elasticity of goods types (ρ = 1,ε = 1,γ = 0,ω = 0,λ = 2.5)
Rate of collective bargaining coverage: High Medium Low Competitive
labor markets
Preset prices
–Complete exchange pass-through 0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.06
–Zero exchange pass-through 0.69 0.65 0.61 0.57
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Table 4: Welfare effect of a domestic monetary expansion (General specification)
General utility with high elasticity of goods types (ρ = 4,ε = 2,γ = 0.75,ω = 1,λ = 7)
Rate of collective bargaining coverage: High Medium Low Competitive
labor markets
Preset prices
–Complete exchange pass-through 0.29 0.19 0.13 0.08
–Zero exchange pass-through 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23
General utility with low elasticity of goods types (ρ = 4,ε = 2,γ = 0.75,ω = 1,λ = 2.5)
Rate of collective bargaining coverage: High Medium Low Competitive
labor markets
Preset prices
–Complete exchange pass-through 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.03
–Zero exchange pass-through 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26
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